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The paper presents an investigation of 72 Japanese manufacturing firms from five
different industries with the focus on horizontal industrial groups (keiretsu). Data source
was the "Kaisha Database" at the Science Center Berlin. The main findings are:
Using the hexagon criterion to estimate the excellence of firms, the independent firms
achieved better results. Thus we conclude that belonging to a keiretsu is no longer a
guarantee for the success of a company. A different bank-firm relationship leads to
different income distribution: the „old” keiretsu pay higher wages while the independent
firms pay more dividend per share. Our best speculation is that the “old” keiretsu are
still somewhat isolated from the market and the independent firms have to be more
attractive to their shareholders. The structure of the boards of directors differs in
following points: keiretsu firms have clearly larger boards than independent firms.
Independent firms have on the average less directors dispatched from financial
institutions, but do have a higher number of outsiders. They appoint more amakudari
bureaucrats from the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance to outbalance the better
bank-firm relations of the keiretsu. The keiretsu, however, appoint more bureaucrats
from state institutions related directly to their business.
                                                          
* I would like to thank Professor Takeo Nakatani and Professor Kunihiko Itô, University of Tokushima,
Japan, for many helpful comments and suggestions.ZUSAMMENFASSUNG
Ist Corporate Governance von Bedeutung? Zu Erfolg und Corporate-Governance-
Strukturen japanischer Unternehmensgruppen
Die Studie präsentiert die Ergebnisse einer Untersuchung von 72 japanischen
Industrieaktiengesellschaften hinsichtlich ihrer Betriebsergebnisse und Corporate-
Governance-Strukturen. Besondere Aufmerksamkeit galt dabei den horizontal
verflochtenen Unternehmensgruppen (keiretsu). Die Studie führte zu folgenden
Ergebnissen:
Die Gruppenunternehmen waren im Mittel der 10 Jahre von 1986-95 weniger
erfolgreich als die ungebundenen Unternehmen. Die Zugehörigkeit zu einer solchen
Gruppe garantiert also den Erfolg nicht. Für die Kontrolle des Unternehmens von außen
spielen Banken eine wichtige Rolle. Aufgrund der engeren Beziehung zu ihren Banken
waren die Gruppenunternehmen unabhängiger vom Kapitalmarkt als die ungebundenen
Unternehmen, was zu einer anderen Einkommensverteilung führte.
Gruppenunternehmen weisen höhere Löhne aus, unabhängige Unternehmen höhere
Dividenden. Zu den firmeninternen Kontrollorganen zählt das ‚Board of Directors‘. Hier
weisen die keiretsu deutlich mehr Mitglieder aus. Die ungebundenen Unternehmen
haben in ihren Boards weniger Directors, die von Finanzinstitutionen entsandt wurden,
aber mehr andere „Outsider“ als die Gruppenunternehmen. In ihren Boards waren mehr
pensionierte Ex-Bürokraten (amakudari) aus dem Finanzministerium und der Bank of
Japan vertreten, hingegen in den Boards der keiretsu mehr Ex-Bürokraten aus den
staatlichen Institutionen, die in direktem Zusammenhang mit dem Geschäftsfeld des
Unternehmens stehen.1
1. Introduction
Keiretsu networks were a focus of attention even before the Structural Impediments Initiative
talks were held. They have provoked a substantial amount of research dealing with the
questions of whether group membership is stabilizing performance, whether it is easing
liquidity constraints and so on. Until recently it was safe to say that a keiretsu firm would not
go bankrupt. But as one could see in the case of Yamaichi Shôken (which was close enough to
Fuyô to participate in the regular kondankai (“familiar talks”) meetings of the group), things
are changing rapidly in Japan.
This paper focuses on the performance and aspects of corporate governance of the horizontal
business groups (often called 'keiretsu' in the Western context and 'kigyô shûdan' in the Japa-
nese) in comparison with the ‘independent’ companies. The largest and best known keiretsu
are the Mitsui, Mitsubishi, Sumitomo, Fuyô, Sanwa and Daiichi Kangyô group, often called
the “Big Six”. They are understood as large networks of basically independent companies,
with a bank (usually a large city bank), a trading company (sôgô shôsha) and some core firms
in the center of it. Other characteristics are stable reciprocal shareholding (kabushiki mochiai),
personal interlocking as well as meetings the top CEO hold regularly (shachôkai)
1.
Vertical business groups consisting of subcontractors, satellite firms and trading firms based
around a large-scale manufacturing firm like Toyota are not taken into consideration.
Corporate Governance is understood as the process and mechanisms, by which the (capital)
market monitors the action of corporate management (Sheard 1998: 7). The system of corpo-
rate governance in Japan “can only partially be explained by classic governance theory. The
most important influence on Japanese corporate management is through a mechanism
combining administrative and personal guidance” (Schaede 1994: 320). Especially in the case
of the keiretsu there are some distinct features which have to be mentioned.
·  The stable cross shareholding (kabushiki mochiai) is aimed to prevent hostile takeovers
and to ensure that control is to be exercised by the shareholders rather than by third parties
(Sheard 1996: 318-319). Since about 70 per cent of the large companies hold their annual
shareholder’s meeting on the same day (Demise 1997: 172), it seems fair to say that in
Japan the individual shareholders are more or less insignificant.
·  Financial institutions play a more important role. The main bank, which is one of the core
elements of a keiretsu, is the main provider of loans, monitors the corporate results (cf.
Schaede 1994: 304; Yabushita 1992; Yamanaka 1997: 25f) and, at the same time, is one
of the main shareholders of the firm
2. Financial institutions like the main bank exert
control by sending CEOs or even auditors to the firms.
                                                          
1 According to the Fair Trade Commission, those meetings are not the place where strategic and business
decisions are made (Kôsei torihiki iinkai 1992); but it is hard to imagine that they do not matter at all.
Furthermore, the meetings can be seen as an institutionalized exchange of information, which is a point that
matters in a world of global dynamic competition.
2 Due to the law, banks are restricted to a maximum 5% stake in the client corporation.2
·  Control is furthermore exerted by other firms, in the case of keiretsu especially by the
Presidents’ Council. The total number of shares owned by other firms of the same group is
fairly high, so that the shachôkai represents a large shareholder and is able to govern. It is
also common to send CEOs or auditors to other firms of the same keiretsu group.
·  Two other corporate stakeholders have to be mentioned. First, government officials have
been playing a crucial role in the Japanese economy for years. “In Japan, a company
president is careful to attend the advice and counsel of former ministry officials who form
the core of the OB network and act to coordinate and harmonize relations between busi-
ness and government (Schaede 1994: 317).” Those “Old Boys” ensure smooth
information flow between bureaucracy and industry and are loyal to both sides.
·  The employees may not be a main governing power, but they have to be taken into
account. Although the Japanese in-house trade unions do not have the power of western
industry unions, the management can hardly ignore their interests. Until recently, the large
companies, providing “lifetime” employment, a relatively sure career path and relatively
high wages and bonuses, could assure the loyalty of their employees.
With respect to previous research, the following hypothesis will be tested:
1. It has been frequently suggested that affiliation to a keiretsu should be seen as a competi-
tive advantage (Eli 1988, 1994; Nakatani 1984; Sydow 1991). Firms within a keiretsu have
the advantage of economy of scope (Sheard 1998: 9), they can rely on support from the
other member firms and especially the bank in times of crisis (Nakatani 1984: 229). This
“mutual insurance scheme” is said to be the reason for the lower, but more stable
profitability of the keiretsu firms (Ito and Hoshi 1992: 87). But things have been changing
over time, and so Lincoln, Gerlach and Ahmadjian suppose that “… the combination of
deregulation, structural change, and macroeconomic shocks explains the fast decay of the
redistribution pattern among the big-six keiretsu after 1985” (1996: 81).
H1: Keiretsu affiliation is no longer a guarantee for excellent results.
2. According to Nakatani, “group formation makes it possible for individual firms to insulate
themselves from the imperatives of market forces” (1984: 245). Keiretsu firms have a
different relationship to their main bank, which allows them to operate with a lower equity
ratio and ensures the flow of capital. They pay out income more heavily in wages, while
independent firms have to attract the capital market.
H2: A different bank-firm relationship results in different income distribution.
Keiretsu firms pay higher wages, independent firms higher dividends.3
3. During the phase of high economic growth, Japan's industrial policy has been one of the
main factors for the success of Japanese firms, especially the keiretsu. A constant infor-
mation flow between bureaucracy and industry has been maintained through the employ-
ment of retired bureaucrats by the enterprises, called amakudari (Schaede 1994, van
Wolferen 1989).
H3: Differences in the structure of the boards of directors reflect different bank-firm
relationship and access to government-related resources.
2. Data Set and Methodology
2.1. Data
The sample analyzed in this paper comes from the “Kaisha Database” at the Science Center
Berlin and is a subset of 72 Japanese manufacturing firms listed at the Tôkyô Stock Exchange.
Since others have already given explanations on the setting of the Database, I restrict my
remarks on the setting of this sample.
Determining, which firms belong to a keiretsu and which are independent, is somewhat diffi-
cult. It is important to keep in mind that group affiliation is not clearly defined, and even
among and within the groups relations do vary. We use the definition of Ito and Hoshi (1992),
according to which: a company belongs to a keiretsu group when it is a regular member of the
“Presidents’ Council” (shachôkai). The advantage of this definition is that the sample is rela-
tively constant and can be checked easily. Furthermore the firms joining a Presidents’ Council
are said to belong to the most powerful companies in Japan. According to Kikkawa (1996),
who pays close attention to the foundation of the Presidents’ Councils, as well as according to
Miyashita and Russel (1994), the keiretsu groups were divided into the “old” (containing
Mitsui, Mitsubishi and Sumitomo) and the “new” groups (with Fuyô, Sanwa and Daiichi
Kangyô). As the later analysis will show, there are indeed significant differences between
these groups.
Furthermore, the present investigation used five out of the eight industries defined in 1993 and
represented in the “Kaisha Database”. To be precise, Machine Tools, Consumer Electronic &
Parts and Shipbuilding had to be eliminated from the sample because they exclusively
contained either affiliated or independent firms. The remaining industries are Chemicals,
Pharmaceuticals, Industrial Machinery, Heavy Electric Machinery and Communication
Equipment.
2.2. Methodology – the Hexagon Criterion
To measure the performance of the firms, a version of the hexagon criterion developed by
Albach (cf. Albach 1987) and first applied to Japanese firms by Albach and Moerke (1996)
was used. It consists of the dimensions growth rate of equity, growth rate of fixed assets, ratio
of market value over book value of the firm, return on equity, return on total capital, and4
return on sales. These six dimensions are then integrated into a “Radar Chart”. The area of
this radar chart hexagon is interpreted as a measure of the excellence of the respective firm.
The advantage of this criterion is obvious: The performance of a firm is judged in a broader
way than could be done only using profitability or sales figures, and it pays particular attention
to the balance. The criterion has been applied to several studies in Germany (for instance,
Pfannschmidt 1993) and has been a topic of discussion in Japan, too.
3. Results
3.1. Performance
The calculations show that the keiretsu firms are far from being better than independent
companies.
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With the exception of Mitsubishi, the average hexagon value of all keiretsu groups is lower
than that of the independent firms. This holds true for an analysis per industry.
Table 1: Average Hexagon Value per Industry (1986-1995)
Independent Firms Keiretsu Firms
Chemicals  12.87%  12.37%
Pharmaceuticals  16.71%  13.23%
Industrial Machinery   10.44%   6.09%
Heavy Electric Machinery   10.37%   7.85%
Communication Equipment   12.95%   8.93%
When looking at each individual dimension over ten years (cf. appendix), some remarks
should be added. The higher growth rate of fixed assets can be seen as an attempt to substitute
work-intensive by capital-intensive production and includes heavy investment in R&D
facilities (Goertzen 1998). Since the growth rate is highest between 1989 and 1991, an over-
investment during the bubble period can not be excluded. But we can say for sure that the rise
in fixed assets is not mainly caused by property speculation during that time. Although the
absolute value of the owned property rises, it is rising stably, and the ratio of property owned
to total capital stagnates between 1987 and 1992 (“old” keiretsu) or even decreases (“new”
keiretsu and independent firms).
The growth rate of equity is highest for the Mitsubishi and Mitsui groups, followed by the
independent firms. It is safe to say that all companies tried to use the rising share prices during
the bubble economy. One hint of this is the point that the number of newly issued shares
dropped clearly after the bubble burst. To make this clear, we divided the ten years investi-
gated into two parts, the period from 1986 to 1990 and from 1991 to 1995.
Table 2: Growth Rate of Market and Value over Book Value
1986-1990  Delta Fixed Assets  Delta Equity  Market over Book
     Independent  10.13%  14.19%  202.52%
“Old” keiretsu  5.97%  17.50%  179.73%
“New” keiretsu  6.93%  12.97%  202.19%
1991-1995
     Independent  6.73%  3.80%  152.11%
“Old” keiretsu  5.93%  2.40%  133.52%
“New” keiretsu  3.59%  2.51%  154.54%
The ratio of market value over book value peaks for every sample 1989. And then, except for
a short break from 1992 to 1994, it continuously decreases and falls even lower than the 1986
level. Obviously the market remains skeptical about the prospects of success.6
The return ratios we have calculated are aimed to prepare for a comparison of Japanese and
German companies which is the topic of investigation right now. This is why they differ from
those mostly used in Japan. While in Japan the ordinary profit (keijô rieki) is common, we use
the current profit (zeibikimae tôki jun rieki) and include interest of liabilities. As a check, the
Japanese return ratios were calculated, too. These results lead to nearly the same rankings –
the independent firms in all cases reach the highest values. The differences to our calculation
is to be seen in that the “new” keiretsu reach second place in return on total capital and
hexagon criterion.
As to be seen above, in the investigation with the Hexagon Criterion the independent firms
reach better results. Therefore it is safe to say that affiliation to a keiretsu is no guarantee of
the excellence of a company.
4. Consequences of a different Bank-Firm Relationship
4.1. Capital Structure
Previous research showed clear differences in capital structure. To explain everything in detail
would go beyond the scope of this paper, so I shall briefly summarize the results which were
crucial to our interpretation that the keiretsu firms do in fact have a closer relationship to their
main banks. The first table in this section shows how the proportion of shares and liabilities
have changed from the first year of this investigation (1986) to the last one (1995).
Table 3: Capital Structure
1986  Independent  “New” keiretsu  “Old” keiretsu
     Equity  41.88%  29.09%  19.92%
     Current Liability  41.88%  50.21%  56.72%
     Long-term Liability  16.24%  20.70%  23.36%
1995
     Equity  46.19%  35.44%  29.11%
     Current Liability  32.23%  40.11%  41.43%
     Long-term Liability  21.58%  24.45%  29.46%
The rising equity ratio of all samples is obvious. That the “old” keiretsu managed to increase
their ratio more, can be explained by the number of newly issued shares. During the time
investigated they issued a number of shares that would correspond to 30 % of the total number
of shares in 1986 (while the “new” keiretsu and independent firms issued approximately
20%). The “old” keiretsu want to loosen their ties to the banks – a process Yabushita calls
“ginkô banare” (Yabushita 1992: 27). Furthermore, the “old” keiretsu increased their long-
term liabilities and decreased their current liabilities more than the other samples did. Since
quick access to money through banks is not very likely in the current situation, this can be
seen as an attempt to secure investment and stabilize the supply of capital. Looking at the7
lower equity ratio, it seems fair to say that the “old” keiretsu still must have a closer
connection to their main banks. This matches the findings by Hoshi, Kashyap and Scharfstein,
that “the closer a firm moves to the group banks, the more easily a firm can attract funds to
finance investment projects” (1991: 49).
4.2. Income distribution
According to Nakatani, group membership increases the monopoly power of respective
members, which is not necessarily used for raising the profit, but to “maximize … the joint
utility of its corporate constituents – employees, financial institutions, stockholders and
management” (1984: 228). He points out that for managers of large Japanese corporations a
main goal of corporate policy is to enhance the welfare of the firm's employees, what can be
seen as contrary to the situation in the United States, but similar to that in Germany (cf.
Yoshimori 1995, Sakakibara 1995). Our supposition that differences in the income distri-
bution could exist, came from our observance of differences in the ratio of current profit
before tax (zeibikimae tôki jun rieki) per employee. As one can see in picture 2, the inde-
pendent companies reach a higher profit/employee ratio throughout the years.
Picture 2: Current Profit per Employee8
Nakatani's findings, that the average income of an employee in a “G firm” (group firm) is
higher than that of an “I (independent) firm” employee, to a certain extent match the results of
this study. According to the statements in the yûka shôken hôkokusho (which may be biased
because they do not take into account the differences in age, job-tenure etc.), the monthly
salary in the “old” keiretsu firms was higher than in the independent firms as well as in the
“new” keiretsu. The last two turn out to be rather similar.
Table 4: Average Wages (per month), in Yen
It is furthermore of interest to ask how independent companies and keiretsu firms differ in
terms of dividend distribution. It turned out that the independent firms which have, compared
to the keiretsu, issued relatively few shares (245 million vs. 657 million for the “new” and
1.01 billion for the “old” keiretsu on average), pay a higher dividend. Table 5 shows, that the
average dividend per share that the independent firms paid, was higher than for each of the
keiretsu groups. Due to the large number of shares issued, the ratio of paid dividends to net
profit (after tax) is higher for the keiretsu firms. It would be even higher if the cross share-
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Table 5: Dividend and Dividend/Profit Ratio (Average, 1986-1995)
Sample  Dividend per Share (Yen) Paid Dividends/Net Profit
(%)
Independent  8.54  15.98
“Old” keiretsu  5.76  23.92
Mitsui  5.69  18.54
Mitsubishi  5.88  27.34
Sumitomo  5.60  25.60
“New” keiretsu  6.01  19.27
Fuyô  5.67  18.01
Sanwa  6.83  15.63
DKB  6.34  21.91
To summarize: In this section we were able to show that the wages derived from the yûka
shôken hôkokusho are still higher for the “old” keiretsu and remain very similar, but lower,
for the “new” keiretsu and the independent firms. On the other hand, independent firms pay a
higher dividend per share. Together with the different capital structure, we interpret these facts
as support for Nakatani's view, that keiretsu firms, because somewhat isolated from the
(capital) market, can favor their employees over their shareholders. But first of all, this has to
be limited to the three “old” keiretsu groups. Furthermore it has to be taken into account, that
the situation is constantly changing towards a more shareholder-oriented view (Otto 1997).
5. The Board of Directors
5.1. Structure
The structure of the Japanese board of directors was first influenced by the German (dualistic)
model, but changed in 1950 more or less towards the American structure with one body. The
board of directors, which is elected at the shareholder's meeting, consists of directors at
several levels, beginning with the Chairman (kaichô), the President (shachô), Senior
Managing Directors (senmu torishimariyaku), Managing Directors (jômu torishimariyaku)
and the directors (torishimariyaku). Every position is not necessarily found in every firm.
Representative Directors (daihyô torishimariyaku) are chosen among the top level directors,
they fulfill the task of representing the company and they often decide upon the firm's strategy
and business tasks relatively independently (cf. Otto 1997: 55, referring to an investigation of
Keizai Dôyûkai from 1996).
The question, who governs, still remains. It turns out that the main governing body is the
board itself (Baum 1994: 122). But – different to the American system, where “outside
directors” fulfill the task of governing - this does not hold for Japan. The number of outsiders
is simply to small, and the boards is more or less “coterminous with the company's senior
management” (Lincoln, Gerlach and Takahashi 1992: 565).10
The auditors (kansayaku), who are also elected at the shareholder's meeting, at least on a theo-
retical level fulfill the task of controlling the management. Since they are appointed by the
board (Otto 1997), it is unlikely that they can act independently. The situation improved
slightly with the last revision of the Commercial Law (shôhô) in 1993, because it is now
obligatory for “large firms” (paid-in capital more than 500 million Yen) to have at least one
“outside” auditor. (Otto 1997: 49). But in fact a lot of the so-called outsiders did spend most
of their career within the firm or at least an affiliated firm. Therefore control shifts to the main
bank or to the firm which is the main shareholder as well as to other firms of the same group.
For the investigation, we had a look at the personal data concerning the torishimariyaku,
which can be found in the yûka shôken hôkokusho. The analysis of the present sample is based
on the following assumptions: People were treated as outsiders, when they spent more than
half of their working life outside the firm. They were treated as amakudari, when they had
spent more than half of their working life in a state institution. Customs office is also taken
into account, as well as NTT. Since NTT developed from a ministry and is still highly regu-
lated and connected with the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications, people from this firm
are seen as amakudari.
According to Hirata (1996) and Otto (1997), the top management is defined as consisting of
the Chairman (kaichô), the President (shachô), Senior Managing Director (senmu torishimari-
yaku) and Managing Director (jômu torishimariyaku). Those representatives constitute the
jômukai, the organ which is aimed to deal with strategic decisions and prepare suggestions to
be discussed and which are usually accepted by the board (Otto 1997). Furthermore, the
Representative Directors (daihyô torishimariyaku) are taken into account.
The analysis lead to the following results: The total for numbers of board members, for Repre-
sentative Directors and for the top management respectively rose from 1986 to 1992 and than
declined. The number of auditors, which had not changed very much up to 1992, rose about
30 percentage points due to the revision of 1993. Detailed Data is provided in table 6.
Table 6: Total Number of Board Members
Year  Total  Representative
Directors
Top Management  Auditors
1986  1438  261  688  218
1989  1521  278  748  216
1992  1644  294  802  222
1995  1572  275  801  285
Since the aim of this paper is to investigate the differences between industrial keiretsu and
independent companies, the next step is to present the structure of the board for “the average”
independent or keiretsu firm. On the average, an independent firm has 19.2 directors; 3.5 of
them are Representative Directors. The top management consists of 9.3 members, and at least
3.2 auditors are on duty. The typical “old” keiretsu firm in our sample has 25.8 board11
members (compared with 24.3 for the “new”), 6.2 Representative Directors (3.2), a top
management of 13.1 members (12.0) and 3.5 auditors (3.5). It turns out that the keiretsu,
which are on average bigger in terms of sales, of total capital and of people employed, do have
larger boards than the independent firms. Since the keiretsu firms do not perform better than
the independent companies, it seems fair to assume that their boards are too large to maintain
flexibility.
5.2. Interlocking Directorates
Lincoln, Gerlach and Takahashi (1992) stress the importance of interlocking directorates in
Western economies, but state that their economic significance for Japan is uncertain. For
Germany, Pfannschmidt (1993) was able to show that there is a positive correlation between
interlocking directorates (especially when banks dispatch board members) and the
“excellence” of a firm.
The situation in Japan is somewhat different. Gerlach (1992) points out, that in Japan direc-
torship exchanges are less common but more influential than in the West. They are understood
as a signal that one business partner has a deep interest in influencing the other. One might
add that interlocking directorates are still another important form of information
dissemination in Japanese industry, and therefore one should not underestimate their role. For
the present sample one can say that there is still a difference between numbers of interlocking
directorates in the “old” keiretsu on the one hand and the “new” keiretsu and independent
firms on the other, but obviously the samples are converging.
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5.3. Director Dispatch
Lincoln, Gerlach and Takahashi point out that directors are more or less “… dispatched from
the owning company to the owned company, not the other way around” (1992: 577). It goes
without saying that the banks and other financial institutions have an outstanding interest in
monitoring the firm and exerting control. Therefore we first have a look at board members and
auditors dispatched from banks and other financial institutions. The following table will show
in detail that the independent firms have on the average less people dispatched from financial
institutions (including the main bank) than the keiretsu have. The only exception - the lower
number of dispatched directors from all financial institutions in the case of the “old” keiretsu
- is outbalanced by the higher number of auditors. We interpret the fact, that there are more
representatives of the main bank for the keiretsu, as a further indication (next to the different
capital structure with lower equity ratio) for a closer bank-firm relationship. Since the number
of bank-related auditors in the case of the keiretsu is higher, too, one can assume that the main
bank monitors and governs through the auditors as well as through dispatched directors.
Table  7: Average Number of Board Members and Auditors Dispatched from
Financial Institutions
 Independent  “New” keiretsu  “Old” keiretsu
All Financial Institutions
-  Total Number  1.10  1.89  1.40
-  Directors  0.67  1.03  0.52
-  Auditors  0.43  0.86  0.88
Main Bank
-  Total Number  0.63  0.94  0.98
-  Directors  0.44  0.59  0.46
-  Auditors  0.19  0.35  0.52
Note: The main bank was estimated according to the annually published "Kigyô keiretsu sôran".
At the beginning we said that the number of “outside” directors in Japan is lower than in the
West. Nevertheless, it remains an interesting point to analyze the differences between keiretsu
and independent firms. Since the present sample mostly contains large companies with a lot of
affiliates, the number of receiving firms is not very high. During the investigation there was
empirical evidence that a lot of firms in our sample do send board members to affiliated firms,
but due to the data availability and time constraints only a brief overview can be given. In the
following table the average number of outside directors and outside directors dispatched from
the largest shareholder will be shown. These numbers exclude directors from financial
institutions, because they have been discussed above.13
Table 8: Average Number of “Outside” Directors
Year  Independent  “New” keiretsu  “Old” keiretsu
Outsider 1986  2.08 0.75 2.67
1989 1.95 0.45 2.25
1992 1.90 0.55 1.75
1995 2.28 0.95 2.08
Average 2.05 0.68 2.19
from largest Shareholder 1986 0.92 0.70 0.67
1989 1.15 0.25 0.92
1992 1.27 0.25 0.67
1995 0.87 0.20 0.33
Average 1.05 0.35 0.65
Note: The largest shareholder was estimated according to the annually published "Kigyô keiretsu
sôran".
The relatively high number of outsiders in the boards of the independent firms can be regarded
as an attempt to equalize the better main bank relationship of the keiretsu firms. Independent
firms give (or have to give) their shareholders more opportunities to take part in the decision-
making process. That the “old” keiretsu still have the highest ratio of outside directors, is in
our view linked to cross shareholding and close main bank relation (cf. Ito and Hoshi 1992).
5.4. Amakudari
One distinct feature of the Japanese boards has to be mentioned – the presence of high-
ranking ex-bureaucrats (amakudari). In one of her studies on the “Old Boy” networks
Schaede describes the existence of the network as an “institutionalized ‘lubricating’ system
for government-business relationship” (1994: 2), that ensures access to information and
reduces dependency. One of her main findings is the significant positive association between a
firm in an export industry and a high number of retired bureaucrats (1994: 29). Van Rixtel, on
the other hand, sees amakudari as a “mechanism to equalize differences in access to
bureaucratic information” (1995: 5).
Although the retired bureaucrats might have played an important role in the past, it is not clear
yet whether they are still to be considered useful for the firms in times when market deregu-
lation is happening so quickly. Some researchers even hold the view that the success of the
Japanese companies was possible despite their burden of amakudari (Noguchi 1995).
The main results for this sample are the following: The total number of amakudari bureaucrats
as well as their number in relation to the number of directors, increased from 1986 (34) to
(1989: 42) and peaked in 1992 with 46. In 1995, the number has decreased to 36 and therefore
almost reached the same level as 10 years before. One could see this tendency as correlated
with the ongoing deregulation and fewer needs for the firms to maintain good contacts with
the authorities.14
It has been frequently suggested in the literature that the keiretsu have been a favored place for
the  amakudari  (cf. Usui and Colignon 1997), and indeed the average number of retired
bureaucrats is the lowest in the independent firms (with the exception of 1986).
Table 9: Average of amakudari per Firm
Year  Independent  “New” keiretsu  “Old” keiretsu
1986  0.37  0.45  0.25
1989  0.35  0.65  0.75
1992  0.47  0.65  0.67
1995  0.31  0.40  0.58
Average  0.38  0.54  0.56
The situation looks somewhat different when we only take the number of firms and of amaku-
dari into account. It turns out that more independent firms have amakudari in their boards,
although their number is not very high (between 1.1 and 1.6 ex-bureaucrats per “target-firm”,
compared with 1.7 to 2.4 for the keiretsu). So our conclusion is that widespread use of infor-
mation channels is already possible with a few amakudari, and more does not necessarily
mean better.
When analyzing amakudari, it is, of course, of interest to ask which ministries are represented.
Thinking of Chalmers Johnson's "MITI and the Japanese Miracle", one could suppose that
there is still a strong presence of former MITI bureaucrats in the industry. And indeed for the
present sample their number is higher than that of any other ministry or state institution. This
matches Goeseke's finding, that this ministry is still a relevant force (1997: V). On the other
hand, MITI is not alone. Schaede’s main “results offer strong support for the general
hypothesis that industries employ OBs from ministries that have regulatory relevance” (1995:
313).
For this sample, it turned out that basically the keiretsu firms appointed more retired bureau-
crats from the MITI, from the Ministry of Post and Telecommunications (PT) and from NTT.
In the independent firms, there are slightly more amakudari kanryô (bureaucrats) from the
Bank of Japan (BoJ) and clearly more from the Ministry of Finance (MoF). Obviously, inde-
pendent companies have chosen to appoint ex-bureaucrats from the financial sector to out-
balance the better relations keiretsu firms have with their main banks.15
Table 10: Main Origin of Amakudari Bureaucrats in Independent (I) and Keiretsu (K)
Firms
MITI MITI MoF MoF BoJ BoJ PT PT NTT NTT
Y e a r IKIKIKIKIK
1986 7 5 20101223
1989 5 7 52110236
1992 8 9 41111447
1995 5 6 41213224
Since the keiretsu seem to appoint amakudari coming from an origin relevant for the industry
a firm belongs to, our next step was to take a look at the industries. The findings of Schaede
that “industries that are heavily involved in cross boarder transactions (exports/imports …)
seem to hire more OBs than industries that primarily serve the domestic market” (1994: 28-
29), match our results. In the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, which are not export-
oriented, the average number of hired ex-bureaucrats is lower than for the Industrial
Machinery, Heavy Electric Machinery and Communication Equipment branches. Furthermore
it is interesting that in the chemicals and pharmaceutical industries the independent firms
appoint far more amakudari than the keiretsu, whereas the keiretsu have more amakudari in
the remaining three industries. Especially the Communication Equipment industry where
global players like NEC and Fujitsu are found, has very close ties to bureaucracy.
To summarize: A look at the board of directors shows that the keiretsu, which are on the aver-
age bigger in terms of sales, capital and employees, have larger boards than the independent
firms. Since they do not perform better than the independent firms, one can assume that their
boards are too large to maintain flexibility. Independent firms have on the average less
directors dispatched from financial institutions, but do have a higher number of outsiders.
They appoint more amakudari bureaucrats from the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance
to outbalance the better bank-firm relations of the keiretsu. The keiretsu, however, appoint
more bureaucrats from state institutions related directly to their business.16
6. Concluding Remarks
This study has focused on performance and aspects of corporate governance of Japanese
corporate groups (keiretsu) in comparison with independent firms. The keiretsu which played
an important role in Japan’s postwar economic growth are no longer the successful players
they used to be. They still do have a better main bank relationship and therefore they are to a
certain extend isolated from the capital market. Corporate governance is exerted by the main
bank and – due to reciprocal shareholding – by other firms of the group as well as by the state
through the network of retired ex-bureaucrats.
Independent firms depend more on the capital market than the keiretsu, but their governance
structures still differ from those in the West. Even now, the number of outside directors is
relatively low. The combination of administrative and personal guidance, which is a distinct
feature of the keiretsu, works in the case of the independent companies, too. They try to out-
balance the main bank relationship of the corporate groups by appointing more amakudari
bureaucrats from the Bank of Japan and the Ministry of Finance.
To overcome the current economic crisis, the Japanese economy has to undergo severe
changes. The ongoing deregulation of the financial sector , the “Japanese Big Bang”, is only
one example. Since the independent firms reach better results and act flexibly, they seem to be
on the right way. With Sony, an independent company for the first time introduced stock
options for managers, Others promised to increase the number of real outside directors, and so
on. Japan is changing and will therefore continue to be a topic of research.17
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